Policy Failures: Four Years That Could Have Been Avoided

As President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud campaigned with the promise of ‘Somalis at peace with themselves and at peace with the rest of the world,’ many citizens hoped Somalia was embarking on a new era characterized by reconciliation, institutional rebuilding, and national solidarity. Following prolonged periods of political instability and fragmentation, this vision struck a chord throughout the nation.

Four years on, numerous Somalis feel the nation has grown more fragmented, institutions have been weakened, and Somalia’s standing internationally has deteriorated. Confidence among the public has eroded significantly, internal divisions have intensified, and concern about the country’s trajectory has mounted domestically and internationally.

This commentary examines the policies and approaches implemented during President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s four-year term. It analyzes how measures framed as reforms or nation-building efforts instead fueled polarization, institutional friction, and mounting anxiety regarding Somalia’s future prospects.

Crucially, most of these challenges were not unavoidable. They resulted from political decisions that might have been prevented through wider consultation, compromise, and inclusive governance approaches.

The outcome is particularly striking given that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was not an unfamiliar figure in Somali politics. Prior to assuming the presidency in 2012, he had been involved in civil society and educational initiatives and was generally regarded as a moderate leader familiar with reconciliation, institutional development, and dialogue, despite widespread public discontent with his earlier presidential performance.

Following his departure from office in 2017, he served nearly half a decade as an opposition figure, vocally criticizing unilateral decision-making, political marginalization, inadequate consultation, and excessive power centralization in the presidency.

Consequently, many Somalis anticipated that his return to power would demonstrate insights gained from both administrative experience and opposition critiques.

However, apprehensions soon arose regarding the centralization of authority within the presidency. Close associates of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud explicitly acknowledged that he established early in his tenure that his governance style would be highly centralized and guided predominantly by his personal judgment, with minimal regard for opposing perspectives.

This leadership approach is perplexing given that President Hassan Sheikh was aware of Somalia’s actual conditions and constraints before reassuming office. He recognized that the federal government lacks complete jurisdiction throughout the nation. He understood that Somalia’s security framework continues to depend substantially on external aid and international cooperation. He was also conscious that the country still heavily relies on international funding and budgetary assistance to maintain essential state institutions and governmental functions.

Such circumstances should have fostered a leadership approach based on compromise, coalition formation, and political moderation. Instead, the government projected the image of a powerful centralized authority while administering a nation still dependent on fragile political arrangements and external assistance.

Only a leader with complete control over national boundaries, autonomous institutions, and a financially independent government can viably implement authoritarian policies over extended periods. Somalia, however, does not constitute such a state.

Authority lacking legitimacy seldom generates stability in politically fragmented communities.

In nations recovering from conflict, legitimacy outweighs political coercion. Consensus is not an indulgence. It represents an essential requirement for stability and survival.

The question was never whether Somalia required decisive leadership. The nation does. However, in politically precarious settings, strong leadership is evaluated by the capacity to unify stakeholders, balance competing interests, maintain national unity, and establish trustnot through the concentration of authority in a single office.

The cabinet composition amplified worries about centralized authority. Allegiance seemed to override qualifications and expertise in state development. In a nation still reconstructing from institutional disintegration, Somalia needed seasoned professionals and administrators capable of reinforcing institutions and representing the nation competently in international forums.

Citizens both domestically and internationally observed footage of unqualified cabinet members experiencing embarrassment in global gatherings, where Somali delegates occasionally seemed unprepared and struggled to present unified national stances. For a nation reliant on international collaborations, such incidents diminished rather than enhanced confidence.

Yet this seemingly failed to provoke presidential concern. It defies comprehension how a leader can profess dedication to national advancement while simultaneously protecting inadequate performance from accountability and tolerating substandard results at the highest echelons of governance.

No issue demonstrated the government’s centralized methodology more vividly than the constitutional amendment process. Constitutional changes in politically unstable federal systems necessitate widespread participation, consultation, and political concessions. Instead, the process evolved into intensely polarizing and contentious terrain, intensifying distrust among political figures and exacerbating institutional rifts.

Instead of enhancing national unity, the constitutional revision process intensified friction between the federal government and multiple federal member states, many of which perceived the initiative as one-sided and politically marginalizing.

The government’s interactions with federal member states emerged as one of the most transparent illustrations of its progressively adversarial governance style. Rather than advancing federal cooperation, connections between the central administration and various federal member states substantially worsened throughout the past four years.

The administration essentially terminated constructive political dialogue with Puntland and Jubaland, two federal member states that persistently voiced reservations regarding constitutional modifications, electoral processes, power distribution, and the general trajectory of federal governance. Rather than addressing these concerns through continuous negotiation and compromise, relationships developed into patterns of distrust, political estrangement, and confrontation.

Simultaneously, in the perception of many citizens, as evidenced by frequent declarations and confessions from political figures, Southwest State, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug seemed to continue operating under substantial pressure and influence from the presidency. Their governance structures appeared to rely primarily on political survival through alignment with federal authorities rather than through autonomous regional legitimacy. The continual extension of leadership terms without substantive political conditions or widespread consensus further intensified apprehensions regarding the deterioration of federal institutions and democratic responsibility.

No event epitomized this pattern more dramatically than the developments in Baidoa. Exasperated by what many interpreted as persistent political pressure and disrespect from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Southwest State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen opted to advance with a state electoral process independently of the federal administration’s favored political course. This action ultimately prompted military involvement by the central government and markedly escalated tensions in Baidoa. Presently, public discontent remains elevated concerning the individual broadly considered the president’s favored choice for Southwest State leadership. Similarly, the stationing of federal forces is cultivating resentment and distrust, while numerous local residents and political actors believe the election result has already been predetermined in favor of the president’s political faction. Fundamentally, the president’s handling of Southwest State has generated political schisms whose impact may continue to influence the region for years ahead.

Presently, there are mounting apprehensions that comparable strategies might materialize in both Hirshabelle and Galmudug as these states approach forthcoming elections. Such concerns persistently fuel unease regarding the future of Somalia’s federal framework and whether authentic decentralization can endure amid escalating centralization from the national government.

The Baidoa tensions represented component of a wider pattern that many Somalis felt also defined the government’s national strategy regarding elections and political authority distribution.

No single political entity can enforce a national electoral framework on an intensely fractured and politically vulnerable society without widespread agreement and popular acceptance.

Nevertheless, the administration persisted in advocating for a one-person, one-vote system prior to establishing comprehensive political consensus on implementation procedures, legal protections, security protocols, and institutional preparedness. Numerous Somalis continue to question how such a process could feasibly operate under existing circumstances.

The objection was never directed toward democratization per se. The objection was the lack of consensus, openness, and national involvement in how the process was conducted.

International relations similarly grew progressively erratic, with Somalia’s diplomatic approach frequently appearing reactive, inconsistent, and motivated more by immediate strategic considerations than by a systematic long-term strategy.

On one occasion President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud established close alignment with Egypt on matters related to Egyptian national interests, and subsequently engaged amicably with Ethiopia while displaying support for Ethiopia’s stance regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), notwithstanding the profound disagreement between the two nations concerning this project.

A similar pattern manifested in relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia. Occasionally, the government cultivated close connections with both nations despite the enduring tensions between them, especially following conflicts regarding regional influence, security arrangements, and the complex post-Tigray political landscape in the Horn of Africa.

From a diplomatic standpoint, it is exceptionally challenging for a nation to sustain close alignment with opposing regional powers pursuing divergent strategic objectives. Somalia’s changing regional partnerships generated uncertainty regarding the nation’s enduring foreign policy trajectory and prompted inquiries about its strategic coherence. Regional counterparts progressively started doubting the dependability and predictability of Somalia’s diplomatic stance.

Comparable concerns regarding inconsistency and opacity likewise surfaced in the government’s management of significant international agreements.

The administration’s contentious agreements with Turkey pertaining to fisheries, oil, and gas collaboration provoked substantial public apprehension. Political participants contended that these arrangements lacked transparency, parliamentary examination, and substantive national consultation. In nations with fragile institutions, agreements concerning strategic national resources must be founded on institutional credibility and public confidence. Otherwise, they threaten to evolve into enduring sources of political contention and public mistrust.

Additionally, the decision to join the East African Community also provoked serious inquiries among many Somalis concerning timing, readiness, and the nation’s comprehensive economic preparedness for regional integration. Although regional cooperation can offer enduring economic and diplomatic advantages, numerous accession criteria related to infrastructure, regulatory alignment, and trade integration remain substantially unfulfilled, prompting questions about whether Somalia joined the association before appropriately developing its institutions and economy.

These broader governance and policy irregularities were additionally mirrored in the government’s security approach.

The administration’s campaign against Al-Shabaab initially generated optimism. Early military campaigns created momentum and popular backing. However, enduring stability failed to emerge because military actions were not consistently accompanied by sustainable governance, local administration, institutional restoration, and public service provision.

Security specialists have long maintained that insurgencies cannot be overcome solely through military measures. Enduring stability necessitates governance, legitimacy, economic prospects, and public confidence.

Presently, many Somalis feel the nation continues politically fragmented, institutionally vulnerable, economically precarious, and diplomatically erratic. The pledge of unity instead fostered greater mistrust between the federal government, federal member states, opposition factions, and segments of the populace.

Numerous the political and institutional accomplishments attained through years of compromise and reconciliation now appear perilously tenuous.

Nevertheless, much of this might have been averted.

Somalia’s political reality necessitates humility from its leaders, not political excess. It requires coalition formation, not power centralization. It mandates consultation, not unilateralism.

The fundamental failure of these four years was not merely inadequate policy selections. It was the rejection of the very principles of consensus, patience, and inclusive governance that post-conflict states such as Somalia require to survive and advance.

Arrogance, excessive self-assurance, and the conviction that a single individual alone held the solutions to Somalia’s multifaceted challenges ultimately reversed the nation’s progress and forfeited crucial opportunities for unity, stability, and national advancement.

Somalia cannot afford to replicate the errors of the preceding four years. The nation’s future will hinge on leaders who recognize the significance of consultation, compromise, institutional robustness, and national unity over personal political aspirations.

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