Seated in an ornate armchair within his official residence, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi embodies the image of a seasoned statesman.
And with good reason: unlike many East African nations, Somaliland conducts free and fair elections, features a bicameral parliament in its capital, Hargeisa, operates a legal system influenced by British colonial law, and maintains an army answerable to civilian leadership.
The nation’s gold and rare earth mineral deposits are currently being explored, while its 530-mile coastline provides access to the Bab al-Mandab strait – a critical maritime passage connecting the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea.
Up to 15 percent of worldwide maritime traffic traverses this strait, occasionally threatened by Houthi drone and missile attacks. The strategic and economic potential is evident.
Nevertheless, Britain, despite its historical connections to the territory, has persistently declined to acknowledge its sovereignty, ostensibly to avoid compromising its African interests and diplomatic relationships.
Consequently, the UK stands to forfeit the significant strategic advantages that recognizing Somaliland would offer – as nations like China are already stepping in to capitalize on this opportunity.
Mr. Abdullahi, adorned in his signature gold-embroidered headwear, remarked to The Telegraph: ‘Our bond with Britain remains steadfast, yet we anticipate British recognition. If Britain champions human rights, freedom of expression, and democratic governance, it should extend that support to us.’
The UK occupies a pivotal diplomatic role in shaping Somaliland’s future, serving as the United Nations ‘penholder’ with special responsibility for the region.
Mr. Abdullahi accuses Britain of applying double standards in its non-recognition of Somaliland, asserting that the territory meets all criteria for statehood outlined in the Montevideo Convention, unlike the newly recognized State of Palestine.
Somaliland’s position, however, has been compromised by jihadi-affiliated militias seizing control of portions of its territory in lawless border regions. Additionally, a territorial dispute with neighboring Puntland, another breakaway Somali entity, challenges its assertion of undisputed sovereignty.
Mr. Abdullahi, widely known as Irro, highlighted how his unrecognized nation has conducted elections for a quarter-century while successfully containing terrorism and piracy. In contrast, Somalia continues to exist as a failed state.
Analysts suggest Somaliland could provide Britain with strategic military positioning and economic benefits, yet after decades of diplomatic indecision, London’s regional influence is diminishing.
China, meanwhile, is rapidly expanding its military footprint across Africa in a strategic competition with the United States.
China has already established a naval base in neighboring Djibouti and is developing key port facilities to accommodate its naval vessels and facilitate access to nearby mineral resources for extraction of critical minerals.
Turkey is cultivating Somalia as a client state, while various Gulf nations are similarly advancing their own strategic interests in the region.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) stands as one of Hargeisa’s principal allies, with the Emirati shipping conglomerate DP World having invested $442 million (£329 million) in Berbera, Somaliland’s primary harbor.
This development is poised to become the new gateway to East Africa, as a potential agreement with landlocked Ethiopia could boost maritime trade by 40 percent.
Berbera also houses a significant Emirati military installation featuring one of Africa’s longest runways, currently being constructed opposite Houthi-controlled areas across the Gulf of Aden. This future facility is projected to accommodate both American and Israeli military personnel.
The principal US military installation in the region, Camp Lemonnier, is located in Djibouti. Multiple officials and analysts, including Rashid Abdi, a regional expert based in Kenya, have indicated that Washington is ‘exploring potential locations’ for an alternative base within Somaliland.
However, it appears improbable that the US would relocate from Camp Lemonnier, as doing so would effectively surrender complete influence over Djibouti to China.
Mr. Abdi observes: ‘This represents a major strategic maneuver as Washington seeks to constrain China’s influence in the Red Sea. Recent events in Hormuz have highlighted the critical importance of maritime chokepoints. Washington is considering recognizing Somaliland specifically to prevent the Bab al-Mandab strait from coming under Beijing’s control. China hawks such as Ted Cruz are actively advocating for this recognition.’
Israel became the first UN member state to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s independence and sovereignty in December. Nevertheless, when Israel extended recognition, Britain emerged as one of its most vocal critics, reaffirming London’s steadfast support for Somalia.
Hargeisa responded with outrage. Mr. Abdi recounts: ‘The incident nearly sparked street demonstrations. The most pro-British populace in Africa felt betrayed. It represented a significant setback for them.’
In a recent development, Somaliland’s British allies were dismayed by reports suggesting the territory had endorsed Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands.
The president dismisses these allegations as fabricated misinformation propagated through social media channels. Mr. Abdullahi declares: ‘We categorically reject these claims. We have no diplomatic ties with Argentina and fully support Britain’s sovereignty over the Falklands.’
Britain established colonial authority over Somaliland in 1844 (primarily to secure strategic maritime routes that provided an advantage over Imperial France). During both world wars, Somalilanders served under the Union Jack, including as members of the Somaliland Camel Corps.
The territory continued as a British protectorate until 1960, when it gained independence. Concurrently, neighboring Somalia was liberated from Italian colonial rule.
Five subsequent days witnessed the unification of the two territories, yet Somalilanders grew increasingly discontented under Mogadishu’s oppressive administration. Throughout the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Somalilanders lost their lives, with many subsequently immigrating to Britain, establishing communities in London, Birmingham, Cardiff, and other urban centers.
In 1991, Somaliland effectively reasserted itself as an independent sovereign state. This devoutly Sunni Muslim region, where alcohol consumption is prohibited and the hijab is commonplace, subsequently embraced a Western-oriented democratic system – distinguishing itself as the only global jurisdiction to employ iris scanning technology to prevent electoral fraud.
However, it falls far short of a democratic ideal, with practices including female genital mutilation, clan-based discrimination, and elements of Islamic law integrated into its governance. In stark contrast, Somalia, ranking highest on the global fragility index, has descended into corruption and jihadist extremism. Despite these circumstances, the international community has remained committed to maintaining the existing territorial arrangement.
Lacking international recognition, Somaliland, home to six million people, remains excluded from the global financial system, unable to secure sovereign loans, issue bonds, or obtain assistance from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank.
These limitations significantly constrain its capacity to fund infrastructure projects, stabilize its currency, pursue long-term development initiatives, and access affordable capital.
In contrast, Somalia – with substantial territories under the control of al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab – receives substantial British assistance. The Somali government maintains close ties with Islamist groups; its prime minister, Hamza Abdi Barre, openly supports Hamas and has described Jewish people as ‘children of pigs and dogs’.
China, Turkey, and Qatar count among Somalia’s international partners. Nevertheless, staggering sums of British aid have flowed into Mogadishu, despite concerns that funds have been misappropriated and have potentially supported terrorist activities. This year alone, £61 million of public funds have been allocated, with minimal benefits reaching Somaliland.
Israel’s relationship with Somaliland predates recent developments. Israel stands as the only nation to have condemned the atrocities of the 1980s before the UN Security Council.
Considering Israel’s recent international controversies, this partnership has somewhat strained Somaliland’s other diplomatic ties. Nevertheless, Mr. Abdullahi remains resolute and willing to openly endorse the alliance.
He states: ‘Our relationship from the outset has been characterized by openness, honesty, and friendship. Those who criticize us should attend to their own affairs. I will undertake an official visit to Jerusalem this year.’
This week, it was revealed that 50 Somaliland special forces personnel had completed training in Tel Aviv. During a ceremony in Hargeisa on Tuesday, an Israeli delegation presented the president with a fragment of an Iron Dome missile interceptor – representing Jerusalem’s protective umbrella.
Israel’s initiative has encouraged other nations to consider similar diplomatic recognition. Potential candidates include democracies confronting authoritarian regimes, notably Taiwan, which maintains close relations with Somaliland. Although recent speculation that the UAE would extend recognition this week proved incorrect, officials in Hargeisa remain optimistic that such recognition is imminent.
Britain’s position was established in 2012, when Prime Minister Lord Cameron convened a London conference concluding with support for a unified Somalia. This stance has subsequently been reinforced under subsequent Labour leadership.
Omar Mahmood, senior Horn of Africa analyst for the International Crisis Group, suggests that this strategic ambiguity reflects diplomatic prudence.
He explains: ‘There is no requirement to take sides. From a security standpoint, Britain maintains interests in both Somalia, which faces threats from al-Shabaab, and Somaliland. Maintaining relationships with both entities is strategically sound, as recognition would provoke Somalia and result in diplomatic repercussions.’
Mr. Mahmood contends that a resolution can only emerge through direct negotiations between the two parties. He states: ‘I believe prematurely recognizing Somaliland would be counterproductive. It would precipitate a proxy conflict, a perilous path to pursue.’
Apprehensions exist that recognizing Hargeisa’s sovereignty could unleash a cascade of competing claims and historical grievances throughout the region. Somalia might be emboldened to assert its longstanding territorial claims over portions of northern Kenya and Ethiopia, while the nationalist Somali region of Puntland, which controls areas claimed by Somaliland, might respond with overt military conflict.
Furthermore, British officials worry that heavy-handed intervention could exacerbate colonial resentments. The UK might find itself in direct opposition to the African Union, an organization comprising predominantly authoritarian governments with their own delicate territorial disputes.
Sir Gavin Williamson, former UK defense secretary heading Somaliland’s new international recognition initiative, recently traveled to Hargeisa to commemorate the territory’s 35 years of self-governance, dismissing these concerns.
He states: ‘Feelings of colonial guilt and rigid adherence to inconsequential international law now dictate British foreign policy, rather than enhancing the security and prosperity of affected populations and advancing our national interests.’
‘We remain paralyzed by historical apprehensions, unable to demonstrate leadership. Consequently, nations like China and Turkey fill this void, treating the Horn of Africa as their strategic arena. Malicious actors now dominate the landscape. This colonial guilt and postcolonial leadership vacuum serves no one’s interests. East Africans desire our leadership, yet no such leadership exists.’
The former colonial authority, he notes, had previously pledged to be the second nation to recognize Somaliland following initial recognition by another state. ‘This promise was merely a falsehood,’ states Sir Gavin. ‘We are now approaching a moment of profound national embarrassment.’
Jake Wallis Simons serves as a columnist, broadcaster, and foreign correspondent, and previously edited the Jewish Chronicle. He has reported globally for The Telegraph, the Daily Mail, and the BBC, produced multiple documentaries for Radio 4 and the World Service, and frequently contributed to From Our Own Correspondent. Additionally, he co-hosts The Brink podcast with former parachute regiment officer Andrew Fox.